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Memory, Identity, and Representation: The Limits of Theory and the Construction of 
Testimony* 
 
Starting from the perspective that Holocaust theory offers a paradigmatic framework that may 
form the basis for overall reflection on phenomena of extreme violence in modernity, the 
question of the significance of the Holocaust in understanding the possibilities and limits of 
reconstructing identities in post-traumatic contexts is reviewed. The role of testimony, in 
particular, is emphasized as representing a space for translation conducive to overcoming victim 
status and affirming public memory and post-memory.  
Keywords: genocide; Holocaust; identity; Justice; memory; testimony; trauma; violence; victims. 
 
 
As the symbol of a  i epa a le i ilizatio al uptu e  Di e , , Aus h itz has e o e, 
in the context of contemporary thought, the central metaphor for the complex body of 
experiences caused by situations of extreme violence. That is why the Holocaust remains an 
absolutely paradigmatic reference for those who, in a wide variety of contexts, set out to 
analyze the possibilities and the limits of identity reconstruction in the framework of post-
traumatic memory. Nevertheless, the question of whether the Holocaust was a truly unique 
event is one that has been asked frequently and under quite different circumstances. This is 
far from being an innocent question, and reams have been written about it. As was made 
plain in Germany during the 1980s in connection with the so- alled histo ia s  dispute 
(Historikerstreit), to deny the uniqueness of the Nazi genocide is just a short step away from 
an apologetic stance, and more often than not it is permeated with a relativizing intent. For 
historian Ernst Nolte, the main spokesman for the relativizing faction, it was about time the 
German people stopped blaming themselves for the Holocaust, as similar horrors could be 
attributed, for instance, to Stalinist repression. Furthermore, the true historical explanation 
for the Holocaust, according to Nolte, lay in the existence of the Gulag, since the Nazi terror 
was just a reaction to Stalinist terror. Such theses are untenable and were fully refuted at 
the time.
1
 Nevertheless, in comparison with the various experiences of large-scale violence 
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 O  the histo ia s  dispute , see Augstein et al. (1987), Evans (1990), Peacock (2001), Forum: The 
Historikerstreit Twenty Years On  (2006). 




 century, the attempt to view the Nazi genocide as just one instance 
among others crops up now and then in public discourse with unfailing regularity.  
The truth is that the Holocaust presents some features that are absolutely unique, to wit: 
the decision to exterminate not just one group as such, but every single human being 
classified as belonging to that group, to the last one of its members; the centrality of anti-
Semitism in Nazi ideology, which takes extermination beyond all political and military 
rationality (think of the formidable logistics for ensuring the transportation of the deported, 
especially after deportations were intensified in 1943, a time of mounting difficulties in the 
area of military transportation); the industrial scale of the genocide, evinced by the logistical 
organization already alluded to and by the efficient planning of mass extermination, which 
was characterized by a technological rationality that comprised the gas chambers, 
crematoria, and the full utilizatio  of the i ti s  odil  e ai s as a  ate ial.2  
Such uniqueness is indeed the mark of a consummate case of absolute violence, and it is 
in this respect that the Holocaust presents itself as a paradigm. Affirming the uniqueness of 
the Nazi genocide does not mean that it cannot be compared to other extreme historical 
events of a similar nature – in fact, that very uniqueness adds relevance to such 
comparisons, which are not only legitimate but also necessary.
3
 Moreover, it is crucial to 
bear in mind that the unique significance of Auschwitz resides not just in the unique nature 
of the facts themselves, but also in the relevance of the memory-work it generated. As 
Helmut Dubiel (2003) rightly points out, there is no doubt that nowadays the Holocaust is an 
indispensable metanarrative for any other phenomenon of large-scale violence. But that 
means that the Holocaust, while retaining its historical singularity, is seen by our 
contemporary consciousness not just as an event set in the past, but rather as something 
that is still present. That presentification is the result of a long process that for the most part 
did not start until the 1960s, and in which the work of memory plays a much more decisive 
role than the work of history. That is the question I wish to dwell on here – the place of the 
Holocaust in contemporary consciousness does not stem merely from its representing a set 
of historical facts marked by the uniqueness of absolute violence, but is rather a function of 
the depth of the memory work associated with it. Such depth is based on a new paradigm of 
                                                 
2
 On the modernity of the Holocaust, see Zygmunt Bauma s o  lassi  stud  . Bau a s e t al theses 
a e fo eshado ed i  H. G. Adle s poo l  disse i ated studies see fo  i sta e . 
3
 Paul Gilroy, among others, has stressed the need to develop a comparative perspective between post-colonial 
theory and Holocaust theory (Gilroy, 2000). 
RCCS Annual Review, 3, October 2011                                                                                                                  Memory, Identity, and Representation 
 5 
testimony that, among other things, radically questions the role and the concept of the 
victim, presenting itself in these times of ours, through its multiple cross-generational 
ramifications, as an extremely vigorous discursive formation.  
In Die Schuldfrage (The Question of German Guilt), a long, nowadays perhaps somewhat 
neglected, essay published in 1946,
4
 shortly after the end of World War II (Jaspers, 1987), 
German philosopher Karl Jaspers established a few definitions that still strike me as rather 
pertinent and that will be used in my argument. Jaspers starts out by rejecting a loose 
concept of guilt as well as the assignment of collective guilt to the German people – because 
in his eyes the mere concept of collective guilt is absurd, and for good reason. Instead, he 
submits four concepts, which correspond to as many different dimensions of the same 
problem. First of all he identifies criminal guilt, arising from a responsibility for crimes that 
can be objectively established through evidence and subject to sentencing in common 
courts. The second type of guilt is political guilt. It is generated by decisions emanating from 
state institutions and can only be subjected to sanctions imposed in the framework of 
situations where the winners are in charge. In other words, in case of defeat, the winning 
powers may establish a new legal framework that criminalizes acts that were formerly 
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. This was precisely what happened with the Nuremberg 
court, whose most outstanding feat, as is well known, was the establishment of the concept 
of crimes against humanity. Thus, the definition of political guilt in the Jaspersian sense 
enabled the creation of a decisive legal precedent.  
Thi dl , the e is Jaspe s  defi itio  of moral guilt, a concept which implies ethical 
responsibility for participating in criminal acts, even where there is no criminal responsibility 
involved (typically, being forced to carry out orders while having no means of evading them). 
This particular dimension of guilt has to do with the individual conscience, and the tribunal is 
that of o e s o  o s ie e. Jaspe s fou th a d last oncept is that of metaphysical guilt, 
which involves a notion of responsibility that is independent of any act of commission or 
omission on the part of the individual, since it refers to the sense of responsibility felt by 
every human being regarding all violence against another human being. This is then a 
fundamental ethical principle encompassing all of humankind and extending to succeeding 
                                                 
4
 In 1937, as a result of his wife being labeled as Jewish, Jaspers was removed from the university and 
ostracized by the Nazis. Until 1945 the couple lived under the constant threat of deportation. In his essay, 
however, Jaspers positions himself neither as an outsider nor a victim, but rather as someone who neither can 
nor wishes to shirk collective responsibility. 
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generations, and which, by definition, can never expire. Notwithstanding the religious 
overtones undeniably given to it  Jaspe s  justifi atio , the o ept st ikes e as u iall  
relevant today, as it points to a basic ethical principle of respect for human rights, which is 
the sole viable foundation for a comprehensive, universal ethics in our times.
5
 
It is a well-known fact that criminal prosecution of Nazi crimes in Germany
6
 did not start 
until the early 1960s, which was relatively late. The Nuremberg trials had set a new 
paradigm for international law, but the advent of the Cold War soon led to a policy of 
restoration and to the strengthening of a conservative political course that was to relegate 
the hole issue of the e e t Nazi past to a se o da  positio  i  Ge a s pu li  
consciousness. It was not until 1958 that an official agency – the Central Office of the Judicial 
Authorities for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes ("Zentrale Stelle der Aufklärung 
zur Landesjustizverwaltungen Nationalsozialistische Verbrechen") – was established in 
Ludwigsburg with the purpose of initiating proceedings against Nazi criminals. The work 
carried out by the Central Office, which was expressly created to investigate crimes that had 
been committed outside Germany, and that for this reason had so far evaded the jurisdiction 
of West German courts, was to become extremely important, even if it had to overcome 
numerous obstacles over the years. Right at the beginning, for instance, it had to face the 
iole t oppositio  of A to  “au , the it s mayor, who feared that the new office of judicial 
investigation might give Lud igs u g a ad a e.  But the offi e s a ti ities soo  ega  to 
bear fruit, and within just a few years they gained full public visibility with the sessions of the 
so- alled Aus h itz t ial  (1963-1965) of officials of the Auschwitz concentration camp. 
These were the first major trial proceedings initiated  the )e t ale “telle,  with many 
others to follow.  
Despite the importance of such moments of affirmation of the judiciary vis-a-vis the 
rationale of virulent self-exculpation on the part of vast sectors of German society, the 
Offi e s a ti ities al a s et ith politi al o st u tio , a d the e as i deed a sig ifi a t 
disproportion between the number of cases prosecuted and the number of actual 
convictions (not to mention the fact that the latter were often rather light or just symbolic at 
that). In fact, out of 106,496 people who were investigated as part of about 15,000 cases 
                                                 
5
 For a discussion of the question of German guilt in Jaspers and Hannah Arendt, see Schaap (2002). 
6
 I speak here of the Federal Republic, thus leaving aside the German Democratic Republic and Austria, where 
the process of confronting the past has other, albeit equally problematic, specificities. 
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(typically against more than one defendant per case), only 6495 were actually convicted. In 
some particularly sensitive areas, such as those permeated by the myth that the regular 
army had never been involved in criminal actions,
7
 the disparity is even more blatant. Thus, 
of about 1000 cases prosecuted against members of the Wehrmacht who were accused of 
war crimes, not even one was brought to court.
8
  
For obvious generational reasons, that phase is now virtually over. One should not expect 
to see many more Nazi criminals being prosecuted. The case against John Demianiuk, a camp 
guard at Sobibor who is currently being tried in Munich, may well be the last and – given the 
advanced age of the defendant, already 89 years old when the proceedings started, on 30 
November 2009 – may not even come to an end.  
Was justice done then? In truth, only to a limited extent, as one can easily see: many 
criminals ended up unpunished, and in any event reparation to the victims could not but be 
disproportionately small, not just because of the irreparable enormity of the pain that was 
inflicted, but also because – as Shoshana Felman, among others, point outs (2001) – current 
jurisprudence is not victim-centred, but rather centred on reparation to society. In the 
conventional space of the courtroom, the victim's testimony is relevant only insofar as it 
contributes to evidence building. All other dimensions of the testimony are thus rendered 
secondary, with the frequent result that reenacting the trauma entails no process of 
liberation for the victim, but a new punishment instead. In other words, within the context 
of the courtroom memory should be at the sole service of historical reconstruction and 
therefore remain subordinate to history and to fact-finding, relegating the witness to a 
minor role in a judicial machinery that totally transcends him/her.  
As we all know, the amount of historical knowledge that is available today, after more 
than 60 years devoted to the study of Nazi crimes and the Holocaust in particular, is huge 
and virtually unmanageable. One may safely say that historical knowledge regarding the Nazi 
genocide of the Jews and the whole of National Socialist crimes against humanity is now 
firmly established. Although historical studies continue to be carried out in significant 
numbers, mostly with a local emphasis, the basic facts have long been established and 
                                                 
7
 The myth fell apart once and for all after the mid-1990s, in the wake of the exhibition on the Wehrmacht war 
crimes. Organized by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, the exhibition was shown in many cities 
throughout Germany and Austria over several years and amidst great controversy (Heer and Naumann, 1995; 
Heer, 2005). 
8
 The data o  the )e t ale “telle  is f o  the Offi e s e  site http://www.zentrale-stelle.de). See also the 
informative Wikipedia entry. 
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barring a few exceptions (such as the existence of a written order by Hitler at the origin of 
the fi al solutio ) invite little or no controversy.  
The questions that still stay and will remain open – the questions for which there may 
never be a satisfactory answer and which, for that reason, sharply demarcate the limits of 
theory – have nothing to do with fact-finding or with mere historical interpretation, but 
rather with memory and postmemory, that is, with real individuals relating to the past in a 
way that is dependent on their engagement in the present.
9
 After posing the question 
Whose Auschwitz? , as he does in the title of his crucial 1998 essay, Imre Kertész does not 
hesitate to provide an outright answer: Auschwitz belongs less to the generation of the 
victims, from whose age-worn hands it is gradually slipping away, than to the next 
generation and those still to come.  But Ke t sz also adds o e e uall  lea  p o iso: fo  as 
lo g as those ge e atio s lai  it  : . Thus e fi d ou sel es agai  fa ed ith 
Jaspers and the concept of metaphysical guilt, and we are brought back to the question I 
asked above: how is it possible that Auschwitz can represent not just a historical fact or a 
past event, but a reality that is ever present and therefore capable of providing a 
paradigmatic foundation for a human rights ethics in our times?  
The answer to this question, in my view, is inextricably linked to the question of 
testimony itself. We are all familiar with the aporia of testimony, first raised by Primo Levi in 
1986 in his I sommersi e i salvati (The Drowned and the Saved), and taken up by Giorgio 
Aga e s u ial efle tio s o  Aus h itz Aga e , ; Ve hi, . He e s Le i i  a  
often-quoted passage: [T]he history of the Lagers has been written almost exclusively by 
those ho, like self, e e  fatho ed the  to the otto . […] Those ho did so, those 
who saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute  Le i, : 
6 and 64). Which is to say that the real witness, the one with the ultimate, most vivid 
knowledge, is that who, paradoxically, is unable to testify.  
But Levi does not view this apparently insoluble aporia as paralyzing. On the contrary, it 
distinctly gives the ethics of testimony a very precise meaning in that it sets its limits, but in 
no way does it make one overlook the fact that the witness is also, etymologically, terstis, a 
                                                 
9
 The concept of postmemory was first introduced by Marianne Hirsch in her study on photography, narrative 
and memory (Hirsch, 1997). In a recent essay, she defines the concept in the following manner: Postmemory 
describes the relationship of the second generation to powerful, often traumatic, experiences that preceded 
their births but that were nevertheless transmitted to them so deeply as to seem to constitute memories in 
their own right  Hi s h, : . 
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third party, who happened to be present and therefore is also in a position to attest to the 
veracity of the facts, and all the more so when, as is here the case, the testifying third party 
can also speak in the first person. This despite the fact that, by reason of the mere reality of 
su i al, the it ess s status a ot ut e p o le ati al, a o di g to Le i, e ause – as 
the latter unflaggingly insists – being allowed a few privileges, no matter how small, or 
establishing even a minimal degree of complicity with the exterminators were common 
o ditio s fo  su i al i  the death a ps  uthless a hi e . This makes testimony even 
more difficult, because a victim status carries with it, if only to an infinitesimal degree, the 
ambiguity of having once been an accomplice as well. This uniquely disturbing problem is 
dis ussed i  the G a  )o e,  o e of the hapte s i  P i o Le i s The Drowned and the 
Saved. This particular chapter contains the following remarks about the possibility of bearing 
witness on the part of the extremely few survivors of the teams in charge of the most 
terrifying work carried out in the death camps – operating the crematoria:  
From men who have known such extreme destitution one cannot expect a deposition in the 
juridical sense of the term, but something that is at once a lament, a curse, an expiation, and 
an attempt to justify and rehabilitate themselves. One should expect a liberating outburst 
instead of a Medusa-faced truth. (Levi, 1989: 36) 
The distinction Levi here makes between testimony in the legal se se a d a i ti s 
testimony is crucial if one is to understand that a broad sense of the concept is indeed what 
we find underlying the transformation of the Holocaust into a universal paradigm. Levi 
repeatedly reminds us that testimonies should be read with a critical eye  (ibid.: 6): an 
eyewitness is neither a historian nor a philosopher (ibid.: 122), and for the average prisoner 
the a p s o ki gs as a hole e e totally indecipherable, since the observable horizon 
was inevitably very narrow in scope (ibid.: 24). The witness in most cases is not a hero either, 
nor an exceptional being, but rather someone who was permitted to survive thanks to a 
combination of chance circumstances. To put it differently, the value of testimony and its 
veracity should no doubt be assessed in the terrain of historical truth and sociological 
analysis, but its significance goes well beyond that: testimony, to begin with, provides the 
survivor with a reason to live; it allows him/her to build an authority that frees him/her from 
the mere status of victim while also allowing for him/her to claim an identity where trauma 
is overcome; in short, it gives him/her a winner status in the war against memory that we 
fi d i s i ed i  the Thi d ‘ei h s e ti e s ste  of e te i atio  (ibid.: 18).  
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The early 1960s were a watershed moment, with two events marking the definite 
transition to a context where this mode of testimony enunciation became possible: the Adolf 
Eichmann case, tried in Jerusalem in 1961, and the Auschwitz case, taken to court in 
Frankfurt am Main from 1963 to 1965. In fact, those were decisive moments in which the 
it ess s sile e as fi ally ruptured. It is not so much that witnesses had not spoken out 
until then; they had indeed, and in many different ways. Still – as is often mentioned – no 
one had ever shown any interest in listening to them, not just in Europe and Israel but 
especially in other parts of the world. The big public moment with regard to bringing the 
Nazi leade s to justi e, the Nu e e g t ials, had a el  oa hed the issue of the i ti s 
perspective or even of the Holocaust itself, which the trials tended to view as just a facet 
among others of World War II, a terrible facet for sure, but still a long way from its 
significance as civilizational rupture, as it was to be labeled by future reflection. This is 
tantamount to saying that there existed no public space for witness bearing in the post-war 
period, i.e., the prevailing conditions for enunciation were then wholly unfavorable to the 
articulation of memory, in a public context that was dominated by the wish to forget.  
The problem, however, has to do not just with a hostile environment, but with the no less 
important fact that lived experience seldom lets itself be articulated right away. It takes long, 
hard work to win back the possibility of making memory speak. Robert Antelme, who 
nevertheless had published L'espèce humaine, one of the first major testimonies about this 
self-enclosed universe, as early as 1947, describes the issue in all its rawness:  
[W]ith us we brought back our memory of our experience, an experience that was still very 
much alive, and we felt a frantic desire to describe it such as it had been. As of those first days, 
however, we saw that it was impossible to bridge the gap we discovered opening up between 
the words at our disposal and that experience which, in the case of most of us, was still going 
fo a d ithi  ou  odies. […] No sooner would we begin to tell our story than we would be 
choking over it. And then, even to us, what we had to tell would start to seem unimaginable.  
The disproportion between the experience we had lived through and the account we were 
able to give of it would only be confirmed subsequently. (Antelme, 1992: 3)  
No wonder it was only in the 1960s that such crucial narratives as Jorge Semprú s The 
Long Voyage, Primo Le i s If This Is a Man, and many others emerged on the scene with 
widespread repercussions. And no wonder, too, that the Adolf Eichmann case was perhaps 
also, in this regard, a decisive caesura in terms of confronting the Holocaust (Levi and 
Rothberg, 2003). In her relevant critique of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Ha ah A e dt s 
controversial report on the banality of evil  (Arendt, 1990), Shoshana Felman keenly 
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emphasizes the extent of that caesura precisely from the standpoint of what one might call 
the emancipation of testimony. Emancipation indeed, because at the same time that it for 
once massively gave voice to the victims (with over a hundred survivors attending as 
witnesses) and that it gave absolute centrality to that voice, the space of the courtroom 
where Eichmann was tried also offered the possibility of finding a public mode of 
enunciation for a memory that until then had been confined to private space. Thus Felman 
suggestively views the court as a space of translation, that is, a space for translating private 
memory into pubic discourse, which in turn allows the testifying subject, in that same act, to 
reconstruct an identity beyond trauma.  
From this point or view, the Eichmann case was a privileged moment of discursive 
production for hitherto silenced or otherwise excluded voices, a moment when a public 
discourse of testimony was constituted. One should not view that public discourse as a 
monolithic space, but rather as a tight discursive web where the irreducibly private nature of 
individual testimony can be merged with a discursive stream in which the subject overcomes 
the irreparable solitude inherent in the memory of his or her suffering, at the point in which 
the subject finally finds the possibility of translating memory and, in so doing, of sharing the 
language of a collective experience. That is why, in the words of Shoshana Felman, the 
Eichmann trial is a revolutionary event: It is this revolutionary transformation of the victim 
that akes the i ti s story happen for the first time, and happen as a legal act of 
authorship of history  (Felman, 2001: 320). 
This act of authorship constitutes an exercise of memory that is not concerned with the 
past or with a reconstruction of the past. Instead, it focuses on the construction of a present 
and future identity, one that radically alters the status of the victim. It is an act that literally 
makes the world livable. In fact, as Semprún (1995: 19) and Kertész (2002), among others, 
put it hile i pli itl  alludi g to Ado o s u h de ated e di t o  the a a i  atu e of all 
poetry to be written after Auschwitz, the point is not that life in the camps cannot be 
represented, but simply that it cannot be lived. On the contrary, it is precisely the act of 
representation – a d K tesz goes as fa  as o side i g that the concentration camp is 
imaginable only and exclusively as literature, never as reality,  even though he had lived that 
reality himself (2002: 146) – it is the practical affirmation of the possibility of representation, 
that allows the very existence of a future and makes the world livable after Auschwitz. In the 
context of the Eichmann case, just like in the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials, there is a special 
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significance in the transformation of the criminal court into a space where the universe of 
testimony is allowed to resonate and be collectively constructed.
10
 Again in the words of 
Shoshana Felman, For the world to be livable after the Holocaust, a human narrative of the 
past catastrophe and of the past devastation needed to be legally articulated and combined 
with future rules of law  (Felman, 2001: 235). 
One of the most salient chapters in The Drowned and the Saved concerns the structures 
of communication and incommunication in the death camps. According to Primo Levi, the 
possibility of survival was outright lost by virtue of the inability to communicate and thereby 
gain quick access to vital information. Many of the prisoners could not speak German and 
the camp was a Babel of tongues and dialects. It often happened that the language of your 
fellow prisoner was no more familiar than the language of the oppressors. Furthermore, the 
language of the oppressors was a discourse with its own rules. It was the language of 
violence as analysed by Viktor Klemperer (1991), which even the German-speaking prisoners 
had to learn. This means that the ability to translate was a basic requirement for personal 
survival. In this case, however, the space of translation is confined to the survival function 
a d does ot e tail a st e gthe i g of the su je t s apa ilities e o d hat is ost 
immediate. It is an instrumental kind of translation, whereby language is reduced to a purely 
functional role. In contrast, testimony offers a space for recovering language and also, as a 
result of that, for building community and gaining authority. It is as an author, indeed as 
someone who has the ability to generate a discourse of memory that can be combined with 
a collective discourse and affirm his/her own place within that discourse, that the survivor 
secures for himself or herself the possibility of a future, albeit a precarious one.
11
 
Nowadays a diversity of projects devoted to the establishment of visual archives – among 
others, the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University and, more 
recently, the Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation, founded by Steven Spielberg 
– are proving to be crucial tools for creating a public space of testimony (Assmann, 2006). 
Even more so than written records, video recordings, by force of their performative nature, 
generate a kind of event that allows for communication not just through words, or that 
which is said, but also through that which manifestly remains unsaid in what is said – that in 
                                                 
10
 Ge a  pla ight Pete  Weiss s Die Ermittlung (The Investigation), a 1965 docudrama portraying the 
Auschwitz trials through a montage of the court transcripts, captures that significance in a particularly poignant 
way.  
11
 For a wide-ranging discussion on the relationship between testimony and translation, see Insana (2009). 
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which the experience of the Holocaust far exceeds the possibilities of language. Just like the 
enormous amount of testimony that has been amassed especially since the 1960s, such files 
are vital tools for the construction of postmemory, in that they make it possible to 
participate in what one did not experience. Auschwitz now belongs to the next generations, 
as Kertész claims. It is their ethical task to keep the vibrations of memory always present and 
to keep alive the reverberations of the testimonial evidence of what was the most 
paradigmatic mode of absolute violence of the 20
th
 century. Those reverberations might 
generate other, better conditions for the victims of the many other acts of violence 
committed in the course of that century and all other centuries to be heard.  
Translated by João Paulo Moreira 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
 
References 
Adle , H. G. , Ideas Toward a Sociology of the Concentration Camp,  The American Journal of 
Sociology, 63(5), 513-22. 
Agamben, Giorgio (1999), Ce qui reste d'Auschwitz. L'archive et le témoin. Homo Sacer III. Trad. Pierre 
Alferi. Paris: Rivages. 
Antelme, Robert (1992), The Human Race. Trans. Jeffrey Haight and Annie Mahler. Evanston, Illinois: 
The Marlboro Press/Northwestern. [L'espèce humaine. Paris: Gallimard, 1947]. 
Arendt, Hannah (1990), Eichmann in Jerusalem. Ein Bericht von der Banalität des Bösen. Reclam: 
Leipzig. 
Assmann, Aleida , History, Memory, and the Genre of Testimony,  Poetics Today, 27(2), 26-
73. 
Augstein, Rudolf et al. (1987), 'Historikerstreit'. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die 
Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung. München: Piper. 
Bauman, Zygmunt (1989), Modernity and the Holocaust. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Diner, Dan (1988), Zivilisationsbruch. Denken nach Auschwitz. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer. 
Du iel, Hel ut , The Remembrance of the Holocaust as a Catalyst for a Transnational Ethic,  
New German Critique, 90, 59-70. 
Evans, Richard J. (1990), Im Schatten Hitlers? Historikerstreit und Vergangenheitsbewältigung in der 
Bundesrepublik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Fel a , “hosha a , Theate s of Justi e: A e dt i  Je usalem, the Eichmann Trial, and the 
Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust,  Critical Inquiry, 27(2), 201-38. 
Fo u : The Histo ike st eit T e t  Yea s O  , German History, 24(4), 587-607.  
Gilroy, Paul (2000), Between Camps. Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race. London: Penguin. 
Heer, Hannes (2005), Vom Verschwinden der Täter. Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag. 
Heer, Hannes; Naumann, Klaus (eds.) (1995), Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-
1944. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition. 
RCCS Annual Review, 3, October 2011                                                                                                                  Memory, Identity, and Representation 
 14 
Hirsch, Marianne (1997), Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Hi s h, Ma ia e , The Ge e atio  of Post e o ,  Poetics Today, 29(1), 103-28. 
Insana, Lina N. (2009), Arduous Tasks. Primo Levi, Translation, and the Transmission of Holocaust 
Testimony. Toronto/Buffalo/London: Toronto University Press. 
Jaspers, Karl (1987), Die Schuldfrage. Zur politischen Haftung Deutschlands. München: Piper. 
Kertész, Imre (2002), Eine Gedankenlänge Stille, während das Erschießungskommando neu lädt. 
Essays. Reinbek: Rowohlt. 
Klemperer, Victor (1991), LTI. Lingua Tertii Imperii. Leipzig: Reclam. 
Le i, Neil; ‘oth e g, Mi hael , Aus h itz a d the ‘e ai s of Theo : To a ds a  Ethi s of the 
Borderland,  symploke, 11(1-2), 23-38. 
Levi, Primo (1989), The Drowned and the Saved. London: Abacus. 
Pea o k, Ma k “. , The Desi e to U de sta d a d the Politi s of Wisse s haft: A  A al sis of 
the Historikerstreit,  History of the Human Sciences, 14(4), 87-110. 
“ haap, A d e  , Guilt  “u je ts a d Politi al ‘espo si ilit : A e dt, Jaspe s a d the 
‘eso a e of the Ge a  Questio  i  Politi s of ‘e o iliatio ,  Political Studies, 49(4), 749-
66. 
Semprún, Jorge (1995), A escrita ou a vida. Trans. Maria João Delgado and Luísa Feijó. Porto: Edições 
Asa. [L’écriture ou la vie. Paris: Gallimard, 1994]. 
Ve hi, ‘o e to , Ba á ie e ep ese tação: o sil io da teste u ha,  in Sandra J. Pesavento 
(ed.), Fronteiras do milênio. Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS, 71-94. 
